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A b s tra c t
The present paper presents a theoretical analysis o f  the most impor­
tant aspects o f the Third Package introduced in January 1993 as an at­
tem pt to  prom ote EU air transport competition. The paper analyses the 
strategic effects that arise from repeated interactions among oligopolists 
given the specific features o f the airline industry. In particular, the pa­
per gives some insights into why European flag-carriers seem reluctant to 
fully exploit the more liberal regulatory rules which provide larger entry 
opportunities into new EU markets. To this end, we present a model 
which shows under which conditions the European airline industry is 
more likely to sustain a noncooperative “mutual forbearance” equilib­
rium. (JEL L12,L13,L43,L93)
K e y  w ord s : European Airline Liberalisation, Hub-and-Spoke Networks, 
Repeated Game, Tacit Collusion.
•I am grateful to Andrzej Baniak and Hans-Theo Normann for their useful comments on 
an earlier draft. My special thanks go to Louis Phlips, Stephen Martin and Barbara Boehnlein 
for their discussions and detailed comments on the paper. Needless to say all remaining errors 






















































































































































































An incumbent firm may preclude entry by a rival into a market by at­
tacking this rival in (all) the other markets in which the rival already 
operates. This is not an unfamiliar result to economists (Kahn [1950], 
Edwards [1955]). When one firm might be better off by avoiding an­
other’s “territory” for fear of retaliation, we may end up in a “mutual 
forbearance” equilibrium for the industry. This kind of equilibrium is 
more likely to happen when oligopolists compete in different markets 
and meet each other repeatedly (Bernheim & Whinston [1990]).
The airline industry provides an ideal framework to study these 
strategic issues. Empirical research suggests that strategic effects play a 
substantial role in the conduct and performance of the U.S. airline in­
dustry (Evens & Kessides [1991,1993], Barla [1992]). However, there has 
been little theoretical work to relate these strategic effects to specific fea­
tures of the industry, in particular the fact that airlines operate networks. 
It has been recognised that the structure of airlines’ network plays an im­
portant role in understanding airline economics (Pavaux [1984], Levine 
[1987]). Recent research has confirmed that hub-and-spoke [hereafter, h- 
a-s] networks operated by airlines are an efficient way to organise produc­
tion (e.g., Encaoua & Perrot [1991]) and that the effects of competition 
may have substantial externalities throughout these networks (Brueckner 
& Spiller [1991], Zhang & Wei [1993]).
Using a similar approach to Brueckner & Spiller [1991], Nero [1994] 
has provided a framework for analysing some aspects of intra-European 
airline competition. Intra-European airline competition is modelled in 
the light of the new regulatory measures introduced as an attempt to pro­
mote competition in intra-EU air transport (the so-called Third Package1 
in force as of January 1993). This paper extends the previous paper in 
the following directions. First, dynamics are introduced to take strategic 
effects into account. Second, the model allows for an explicit treatment 
of the most important air freedom rights governing international airline 
competition: (Fifth)seventh freedom and cabotage freedom rights. In the



























































































airline’s jargon the (fifth)seventh freedom traffic right would allow, e.g., 
Air France to serve the intra-European (Paris)-Frankfurt-Milan route, 
while the cabotage right would allow Air France to serve the domestic 
Milan-Rome route. Consequently, a cross-national open-entry policy is 
provided under these air freedom rights. Cabotage rights will be granted 
in April 1997 and correspond to complete liberalisation of the Euro­
pean airline industry2. Seventh freedom rights correspond to the present 
phase of liberalisation, which I call partial liberalisation.
Unlike the developments following the U.S. airline deregulation3 in 
October 1978, recent developments in the European airline industry sug­
gest that European airlines made little use of the new entry opportunities 
provided by partial liberalisation. This lack of entry is acknowledged by 
leading airline specialists4 as well as by the Association of European 
Airlines [AEA]5. Although there may be several reasons why European 
flag-carriers did not fully exploit the new entry opportunities (economic 
downturn, lack of demand or natural monopoly in thin markets, etc.) 
I suspect that strategic interactions arise when airlines repeatedly face 
each other in different markets within a network6. When Air France 
makes use of its seventh freedom right on the Frankfurt-Milan route, 
Lufthansa and Alitalia’s market shares are likely to be affected by Air 
France’s entry. Since Air France operates simultaneously the Paris-Milan 
and Paris-Frankfurt routes, as a result of past bilateral agreements, the 
opportunity for its rivals to retaliate in these markets is large: Lufthansa 
and Alitalia could retaliate in two of Air France’s markets using their 
seventh freedom rights. As a result, Air France may simply be better 
off not serving the Frankfurt-Milan market. A similar reasoning may
2 Complete liberalisation would make the European airline industry legally equiv­
alent to the deregulated domestic U.S. airline industry.
3See Bailey &: Panzar [1981] for a study of U.S. markets during the transition to 
deregulation. According to these authors a total o f 449 nonstop routes were added 
during the period between July 1, 1978, and July 1,1979.
4See, e.g., Geoffrey H. Lipman’s (President of the W orld Travel and Tourism Coun­
cil) comments in the International Herald Tribune, 1 February 1994.
5See AEA Annual Yearbook 1994, p .6.
6This assumption has found recent empirical support in the conduct of the U.S. 




























































































be applied when Air France makes use of its cabotage rights, say on 
the Milan-Rome route. This example illustrates the rationale of this pa­
per. To be more explicit, I want to investigate under which conditions a 
“mutual forbearance” equilibrium can be sustained in the case of partial 
liberalisation and complete liberalisation of the European airline indus­
try. In that respect, this paper is an attempt to provide a theoretical 
analysis of the Third Package. Clearly, the issues addressed in this paper 
could be relevant to EU anti-trust policy.
The sketch of the model is as follows. Three hub-and-spoke [h-a-s] 
flag-carriers7 meet each other infinitely in several geographical markets. 
Depending on the regulatory regime (partial or complete liberalisation), 
each airline has either the option to stick to past bilateral agreements, 
obtaining duopoly profits on the intra-European markets, or the option 
to enter into new markets and to expand its operations. Each flag-carrier 
has to compare its gains from sticking to past bilateral agreements (tacit 
collusion) and its gains from deviating given that, in case of deviation, 
a trigger strategy is applied. In solving the games, one for each reg­
ulatory regime, I will be looking for subgame perfect equilibria. Since 
infinitely repeated games have many different equilibrium outcomes (the 
Folk Theorem), I compare the most collusive equilibrium outcomes that 
can be sustained under each regulatory regime. I therefore define, for 
each regime, a range of discount factors over which noncooperative col­
lusive outcomes can be sustained by the trigger strategy. The regulatory 
regime which has the lower minimum discount factor is, ceteris paribus, 
more able to support the “mutual forbearance” equilibrium described 
above.
The results of the paper are driven by the network h-a-s structure 
and by the fixed costs associated with entry. I assume that fixed costs 
associated with entry into a rival’s domestic leg are larger than those 
associated with entry into an intra-European leg. In the latter leg the
7Only flag-carriers operating scheduled air passenger services are considered. 
Scheduled services make up slightly more than half the total traffic volume in Eu­
rope, as measured in passenger-kilometres. In passenger numbers, the share is much 
greater, at about 76%, the difference being due to an average scheduled trip length 




























































































flag-carrier is already present in both end points, while in the former the 
flag-carrier must add a new station to its network. For sufficiently low 
fixed costs, complete liberalisation provides, in equilibrium, less oppor­
tunity to sustain collusion. In other words, when fixed costs are low, 
flag-carriers are more likely to sustain noncooperative collusive outcomes 
under partial liberalisation of the European airline industry. When fixed 
costs are nil, the range of discount factors over which flag-carriers can 
sustain collusive equilibria is always larger under partial liberalisation.
The paper is organised as follows. Section II introduces the model. 
The assumptions are discussed in Section II.1 with a particular focus on 
the description of the h-a-s network structure. Section II.2 proposes the 
specifications for the demand and cost functions. The main results of the 
paper are presented in Section III. Section IV concludes.
II The Model
II. 1 Assumptions and Model Set-up
The European airline industry has several interesting features. First, Eu­
ropean city-pair markets are typically operated by a few flag-carriers8. 
Second, European flag-carriers are likely to recognise their mutual in­
terests and interdependence throughout the markets (linked networks) 
where they operate because of their long-standing relations in the business9 
Third, because of heavy past regulations and/or geographical character­
istics of European countries, most European flag-carriers operate a h-a-s 
network centred in one major (hub) airport. Given these features, an in­
teresting question arises: Under which circumstances does a flag-carrier 
prefer to guarantee itself “collusive” noncooperative duopoly profits on 
the intra-European markets rather than to meet more competitors on 
more intra-European routes (i.e., to make use of the new air freedom
8See AEA Yearbook 1994, p.21.
9Very powerful and well-organised trade associations such as IATA or AEA cer­




























































































rights provided by the Third Package) ? The game-theoretic model used 
to answer this question allows for an explicit treatment of the strate­
gic effects arising among oligopolist flag-carriers. In addition, the model 
takes the nature of an airline h-a-s network and the European regulatory 
environment into account. The main (static) assumptions of the model 
are presented first (ASSUMPTION I) with a particular focus on the de­
scription of the h-a-s network structure. The (dynamic) assumptions and 
description of the games follow (ASSUMPTION II).
ASSUMPTION I:
• Three identical flag-carriers (airlines), f= A ,B ,C , operate scheduled 
air passenger services on a given h-a-s network. Note that one 
must consider at least three flag-carriers to provide the minimum 
framework for analysing seventh freedom and cabotage airline com­
petition. Flag-carriers are thought of as single-product firms that 
operate in a number of distinct geographic markets (multi-market 
firms).
• Markets are not identical. This assumption leaves room for the 
provisions granted by the Third Package of regulatory rules, which 
provides flag-carriers with the ability to maintain, until April 1997, 
some monopoly markets (usually domestic markets) and to com­
pete with incumbent flag-carriers in other markets (usually duopoly 
intra-European markets).
• As a result of government regulation or some other insurmountable 
barrier to entry (high fixed and/or sunk costs), additional entry 
throughout the network by non-incumbent airlines is ruled out10.
• Flag-carriers provide a homogeneous service. Quantities are air­
lines’ strategy variable. I interpret a choice of quantity as that of a
10Borenstein [1992] argues that, although there are charter companies or regional 
airlines that may be able to enter into some markets, “ the most likely potential 
entrants on any o f the m ajor European city-pair markets are scheduled carriers that 




























































































scale of operation or capacity11. It is assumed that the scale of op­
eration is quickly and easily adjusted12. This occurs because of the 
existence of an active and competitive rental market for aircraft.
• For computational convenience, I assume symmetric flag-carriers,
i.e., using the same technology and operating symmetric networks. 
In particular, each flag-carrier operates aircraft on legs, /, of equal 
distance.
The simplest h-a-s network involving three flag-carriers is repre­
sented in Figure 1. For historical reasons, Airline A  operates aircraft 
on legs l — 1,2,4 which connect cities and F . P  is the central
point (hub) of Airline A ’s network (generally country A ’s capital). Leg 
/ =  4 connects cities i and P  and is a purely domestic leg, i.e., cannot 
be operated by another incumbent flag-carrier. The legs l =  1,2 are 
the intra-European legs and on these legs Airline A  competes simulta­
neously with Airline B and Airline C. Airline B operates aircraft on legs 
l — 1,3,5, connecting cities j ,  M, P , and F . Airline B's domestic leg, 
l =  5, connects cities j  and M. On the intra-European leg l — 3, Airline 
B competes with Airline C. Finally, Airline C operates aircraft on legs 
l =  2,3,6, connecting the cities k, F, P  and M. Airline C ’s domestic leg, 
l — 6, connects cities k and F. In this simple symmetric network, each 
airline is in contact with another competitor on one intra-European leg 
(or two points). Airline A  and Airline B are in contact on leg l =  1,
111 shall refer to Kreps & Scheinkman [1983] in order to justify this quantity game. 
Airline com petition can be modelled as a two-stage process, where airlines set ca­
pacity in the first stage (long run investment in capacity) and compete in price in 
the second stage. Kreps & Scheinkman [1983] show that when the capacities cho­
sen in the first stage correspond to the Cournot output levels, in the second stage 
firms name the Cournot price. Therefore, even if airlines seem to com pete in price, 
Kreps & Scheinkman’s results provide support for the use o f a quantity game. Notice 
that Cournot behaviour in the airline industry has found empirical support in the 
literature, see for example Brander & Zhang [1990,1993].
12In fact, in a dynamic version o f the Kreps & Scheinkman’s paper, Benoit & 
Krishna [1987] have shown that when duopolists have the ability to continually adjust 
their capacity levels or can adjust their capacity levels quickly, they may be able to 

























































































































































































while Airline A  and Airline C are in contact on leg 1 =  2. Airline B and 
Airline C are in contact on leg 1 =  3. Therefore,
• Intra-European legs, / =  1,2,3, directly connect hub airports,
• Domestic legs, l =  4,5,6, connect “peripheral” cities ( i . j  and k, 
respectively) to a hub airport (P, M  and F, respectively) and,
• Each “peripheral” city is connected to another country with a one 
stop service at least.
Figure 1 corresponds to a very simple h-a-s network. An interesting 
generalisation of Figure 1 is to consider a h-a-s network with N  different 
domestic legs (i , j ,k  =  1 ,..,N ). With N  domestic legs, each flag-carrier 
would operate aircraft on L =  N  4- 2 legs. From now on, I consider this 
general set-up.
ASSUMPTION II:
• We assume that flag-carriers, f=A,B ,C , operate in discrete time 
with an infinite horizon and a common discount factor, 6 =  1/(1 +  
r), where r is the constant interest rate. Furthermore, complete 
information, in particular full knowledge of each other’s profit func­
tions, and perfect monitoring are assumed.
• A trigger strategy described by Friedman [1971] is used. The mo­
tives for choosing a trigger strategy are that (a) it is simple to char­
acterise, (b) it is easier to implement than any other more sophis­
ticated strategy13 and (c) it seems reasonable for the airline indus­
try. Flag-carriers face repeated mutual entry threats throughout 
the network according to the regulatory regime. Each flag-carrier 
/  has an action set A f = {to  enter, not to enter} and a pure strat­
egy set Sf = {to  enter if a deviation has been observed, to stick
13Abreu [1988] has shown that the trigger strategy designed by Friedman in general 




























































































to the bilateral agreements otherwise)}. Airlines move simultane­
ously. The stage game (one shot-game) of the repeated games is 
equal under both regulatory regimes and is the following: In period 
t, Airline /  sticks to the existing bilateral agreements so long as no 
entry into Airline / ’s markets has been observed in the previous 
period. If an entry is observed in period t, Airline /  retaliates in 
the following period by entering into its rival incumbents’ markets 
and producing at the Cournot-Nash outcome for the remainder of 
the game. Irreversible and permanent entry together with rever­
sion to the Coumot-Nash outcome is a particularly “grim” trigger 
strategy. Note that irreversible entry rules out strategies such as 
hit-and-run behaviour. The solution concept used is that of sub­
game perfect equilibrium and, given the symmetry (and stationar- 
ity) of the model, I look for optimal stationary symmetric-payoff 
equilibria.
In a first repeated game I consider partial liberalisation of the 
European airline industry so that cabotage rights are not granted to flag- 
carriers. Given the network of Figure 1, each flag-carrier has the option 
to enter on one new seventh freedom (intra-European) leg and to compete 
there with the other two incumbent flag-carriers. As an example, consider 
Airline _4’s strategy in the framework of Figure 1. Airline A  deviates14 in 
period t from previous bilateral agreements by entering the F M  market 
(seventh freedom leg), which is operated by incumbent Airline B and 
Airline C as a result of past bilateral agreements. Following the entry, 
Airline B and Airline C retaliate in period t+1 by entering on the P F  and 
P M  markets. Consequently, the additional profit which arises following 
Airline .A’s deviation should be compared with the losses incurred in 
the following periods when, as a result of (rational) retaliation, each 
flag-carrier operates aircraft on all intra-European legs. Notice that, 
since airlines operate on many markets, costs and benefits following a 
deviation do not raise proportionally. In fact, following the defection in
14In deciding whether to deviate, Airline A  assigns probability zero to a rival devi­




























































































one market (F M ), Airline A  is simultaneously punished in two markets 
(P F  and PM ).
In a second game, I assume a complete liberalisation of the Eu­
ropean airline industry so that cabotage rights are now granted. Now, 
each flag-carrier has the option to enter on one seventh freedom leg and 
2N  domestic (cabotage freedom) legs. It is assumed that, since a flag- 
carrier expects to be punished in all markets (throughout its network), 
it will consider deviating in all markets, i.e., a harsher punishment struc­
ture is used. One might object to this simultaneous large scale entry on 
the grounds that a more gradual entry strategy is more plausible in the 
European airline industry. Clearly, this latter scenario should be consid­
ered as a competitive benchmark under complete liberalisation15. Notice 
that during the deviation period, Airline A  enjoys duopoly profits on the 
former (domestic) monopoly markets operated by Airline B and Airline 
C, while punishment implies that all markets in the network are operated 
by all flag-carriers.
For each regulatory regime, sticking to the previous bilateral agree­
ments, and producing the corresponding collusive output in each period, 
is a subgame perfect equilibrium through trigger strategies in the infinite 




or, in a more informative way,
^.dev , 7T a — 7Tcol
rr-COl
A  <̂
where 7T"' is Airline A ’s per period profit without entry, 7r j ” is Airline 
A ’s per period profit following its entry and 7r̂ un is Airline A ’s per period
15Therefore, not only is it assumed that the scale o f operation is easily adjusted, it is 
also assumed that flag-carriers operate without capacity constraint on airport landing 
slots. W hile it has been recognised that most flag-carriers bear aircraft excess capacity, 
airport landing slots may be an important issue in some busy European airports (see 




























































































profit from retaliation. In what follows, I compare the most collusive equi­
librium outcomes that can be sustained under each regulatory regime. 
Given (1), the regulatory regime which has the lower minimum discount 
factor is, ceteris paribus, more likely to support the “mutual forbear­
ance” equilibrium described above. In order to derive useful results, the 
following specifications are adopted. These specifications borrow heavily 
from previous papers in transportation economics.
II.2 Specifications
Assume that flag-carriers face a linear symmetric demand across city- 
pairs (markets). The inverse demand function for round-trip travel in 
any given city-pair market xy is given by P(Q xy), with Qxy representing 
the number of round-trip passengers in the market xy. Note that Qxy 
represents the number of passengers travelling from city x to city y and 
back, plus the number of passengers travelling from city y to city x and 
back. The demand for international services is limited in the sense that 
D(Qij) — D(Qik) =  D(Qjk) =  0. Put differently, there is no demand 
between cross-border “peripheral” cities. While gaining in simplicity16 17, 
the model captures the following feature: Most intra-European traffic 
flows stop at hub airports. This is particularly relevant for central EU 
countries, where capitals mostly attract leisure and business travellers. 
In order to keep the model as simple as possible, I also assume that there 
is no demand between “peripheral” cities within the same country, i.e., 
D{Qu') — D(Qkk') =  D{Qjj,) — 0, for all ii',kk ',jj' 17. In addition, 
because the change of carrier implies higher risks of missing a connection 
(often associated with the change of terminal in hub airports and/or 
the lack of flight coordination between carriers) or of losing baggage, 
a passenger originating his journey in i and willing to fly to city F, for 
example, is assumed to choose the same flag-carrier, i.e., Airline A. These
16W ith n the number o f cities, the total city-pairs would be n(n — l ) /2 .  When 
n =  6, as Figure 1 suggests, we have potentially 15 different city-pairs. W ith the 
previous assumption, the model is reduced to 12 different city-pairs.
17This is more likely to happen when distance between “peripheral” cities is short 




























































































travellers’ preferences ensure that each airline is able to transport their 
connecting passengers on the intra-European leg. Airline .4, for example, 
carries all the QiF and Q,m passengers. Similarly, Airline B and Airline 
C carries all the Q jp,Q jF and QkP,QkF travellers, respectively. More 
specifically, let the inverse demand function be:
P { Q x y )  — a -  P Q x y ,  with a  and (3 >  0. (2)
The intercept of the demand function in (2), a, is identical for 
all city-pair markets xy. This is equivalent to assuming that the cities 
are similar in size. By eliminating differences in size between cities, this 
assumption allows us to highlight the effects of network and market struc­
ture on the (collusive) equilibria in two different liberalisation settings.
The assumption of common distance of the legs of the network im­
plies a common cost function, Ci(Qi), applying to each of the legs l in 
the network. This cost function gives the round-trip cost of carrying Q[ 
travellers on one leg. H-a-s networking implies that Qi represent both 
local as well as connecting (i.e., with the same origin but with different 
destinations) passengers. On the leg connecting city i to city P  of Figure 
1, for example, Airline M’s aircraft carry both local, i.e., i to P  passen­
gers, as well as connecting passengers. In this case, all traffic Qi routing 
through this leg corresponds to QiP +  QiF +  QiM- Similarly, all traffic 
transported by Airline M’s aircraft on the intra-European leg PM , for 
example, is composed of the local P M  traffic, as well as all the connect­
ing traffic from the “peripheral” cities to M , i.e., Y,iLiQiM■ The cost 
function applying to each of the legs l allows for increasing returns to 
density18 stemming from hubbing operations. Consequently, Ci(Qi) sat­
isfies the following properties: Ci(Qi) >  0 ,C[{Qi) > 0 and C"(Qi) <  0. 
Following Brueckner & Spiller [1991], a general specification could be
18Returns to density arise when an increase o f the volume of transportation services, 
within a given network, is more important than the associated increase in costs. See 





























































































C  =  £ C ,(Q ,)  =  £ 0 Q , - 7Q?, (3)
/ ;
where C  is the additive cost function for each flag-carrier, Qi is the 
traffic volume of the relevant city-pair markets routing through leg l, L 
is the total number of legs operated by the relevant flag-carrier, 9 >  0, 
7 >  0 allowing for increasing returns to density with 9/7  > Q\. Constant 
returns to density imply 7 =  0. It has been argued that constant returns 
to density are likely to appear once the minimum efficient traffic density 
level is reached (see Oum & Tretheway [1992]). Let us assume for the sake 
of simplicity that this efficient traffic density level is reached throughout 
the network, so that 7 =  019. Therefore, the marginal cost per leg is 
constant and equal to 9.
In the h-a-s network suggested by Figure 1, an airline has the option 
to enter into two different types of legs: The intra-European leg or the 
purely domestic leg. From the cost point of view, entry into a leg where 
an airline already operates both end points from its own h-a-s airport 
should not be treated like entry into a leg where one (or both) of the 
end points is not operated, which arises when a flag-carrier enters into 
a rival’s pure domestic leg (see Figure 1). In this latter case, the airline 
has to set ground facilities at the new station, advertise its service to 
consumers who are less likely to be aware of the existence of the new ser­
vice, and so on, making entry comparatively more costly. Many authors, 
in particular Levine [1987], have stressed this feature of airline network 
economics. Consequently, entry is modelled in the following way: Fixed 
costs associated with entry into the intra-European leg are supposed to 
be nil, while they are equal to F  when entry occurs into a domestic leg20.
19Cost-based linkages across markets (costs complementarity) exist as long as 7 ^  0, 
which considerably complicates the analysis o f the effects o f network and markets 
structure on the (collusive) equilibria. See Brueckner &; Spiller [1991] for the effects 
o f com petition in airline h-a-s network with increasing returns to density.
20 It could be argued that sunk costs K  are incurred when flag-carriers begin service 
on a new leg. Since K  can be expressed as a fraction o f F  (K  =  sF  with s <  1), I 





























































































III.l GAM E I: Partial Liberalisation
Given the symmetry of the model, I focus on equilibria which yield sym­
metric payoffs to the three airlines. Let us concentrate on the Airline 
A's equilibrium values. Consider first the most collusive equilibrium 
outcome, i.e., when no entry is observed on the intra-European FM  
leg. In that case, once airlines collude with a staying-out strategy, each 
airline would be better off with setting the monopoly quantity (maxi­
mum level of collusion) in markets with contact, i.e., F M , P M  and PF. 
This is a likely outcome if the flag-carriers can use pre-play communica­
tion to focus beliefs on the best self-enforcing (nonbinding) agreement. 
Under the previous assumptions (in particular, no demand between do­
mestic and foreign “peripheral” cities), Airline A ’s city-pair markets are: 
iP ,iM ,iF , P M  and PF, with i =  1,.., TV. Airline A ’s profit function, 
7r.4, can be expressed as
tu  =  j2P(Q iP)QiP +  £ p ( Q iM)QiM +  j :P (Q iF)QiF
i= l *=1 i= l
N
+ P (Q pm)<1 PM +  P(QpF)<lpp — Ci=pm(qpM +  Y IQ 'm )
i= l
N N




T4 =  ^2ia -  PQip)QiP +  -  PQiM)QiM +  ~  PQ>F)QiF
i= l i= l i= 1
+ ( a  — P { q p M  +  <1p m ) ) ^ p m  +  ( a  ~  P ( l p F +  — ^(Q p m  +
Q*m ) ~ 6(<lpF +  Q'f ) ~  1C 0(QiP +  Q'F +  QiM), (4)
;= i i—i i= i
where QPM =  qFM +  qFM and QPF =  qFF +  qcPF. From (4), it can be 
observed that Airline A ’s revenues are generated from its 3N +2  markets, 




























































































that both P M  and P F  markets are simultaneously operated by Airline 
B and Airline C. In these latter markets, joint profit maximisation is 
assumed. Solving the system of 37V +  2 first order conditions using the 
profit function (4) and the symmetry of the model, we obtain Airline A ’s 
optimal quantities:




Q i p  =
( a - 0) _  s
2/3 ~  2/3 for i  =  1, ..,7V (6)
Q iM =  Q iF  —
(a -20)  (S -0 )  
2/3 — 20 ’ for i  =  1 , TV (7)
where S =  a — 6, and S > 9. Notice that the symmetric structure 
reduces Airline A ’s maximisation problem to a three variables problem21. 
Given (5)-(7), Airline A ’s static profit (4) can be expressed as a direct 
function of quantities/capacities. It can be shown that, in equilibrium
< 4 ( f ) V  +  D +  i ( V ) V .  (8)
From (8), it appears that profit increases as the number of domestic legs, 
TV, increases.
Next consider the case where Airline A  deviates and operates air­
craft on the F M  leg. Given our assumptions, it appears that (a) Airline 
A ’s revenues are generated from 37V -t- 3 markets, while its costs corre­
spond to aircraft flown on L =  TV+3 legs (b) no fixed costs are associated 
with entry into the F M  market, since Airline A  already serves both end 
points of the leg from its h-a-s airport (c) in the F M  market Airline A
21The model prevents arbitrage opportunities from arising, which is a useful require­
ment in a transportation model. In effect, in order to prevent arbitrage opportunities, 
fares must be set such that the sum o f the individual fares for the two legs o f the 
trip (e.g., iP  plus P M )  is larger than the fare for a given city-pair market involving 
one stop (e.g., iM).  If this were not the case, it would be profitable for the traveller 
to purchase the tickets separately. It can be shown that arbitrage opportunities are 




























































































competes with Airline B and Airline C so that Qfm =  Qfm +  Qfm +  Qfm - 
Moreover, Airline M’s toted volume of traffic transported on the F M  leg 
corresponds to the local, qpM, traffic only. Given that Airline B and Air­
line C each produce the (collusive) monopoly quantity in the F M  market, 
Airline M’s optimal cheat strategy is to enter at its best-response quantity 
(i.e., to maximise profit on the residual demand). This occurs at
Qfm — («-») - A40 ~  40' (9)
Given (5)-(7) and (9), it can be shown that the reduced form of the 
static Airline M’s deviation profit is equal to
■*S(i)V+H(^>. <«»
The difference between (10) and (8) corresponds to the additional 
short run profit associated with the entry in the F M  leg and is equal to 
S2/16/? >  0.
After Airline M’s deviation, it is assumed that Airline B and Air­
line C retaliate and enter simultaneously in the P F  and P M  markets. 
Consequently, after Airline M’s deviation, a repeated static Cournot 
game is played on the intra-European FM , P F  and P M  markets. Now 
Qpm =  Qpm +  Qpm +  Qpm 311(1 Qpf =  Qpf +  Qpf +  Qp f - Given the 
symmetric structure of the model, we focus on the symmetric Cournot- 
Nash equilibria where qPM =  qPM =  qPM, qPF — qPF — qPF and 
qFM — qFM =  qFM- Solving the proper 3N +  3 first order conditions 
yields Airline M’s optimal quantities:
Qpm =  Qpf — Qfm  — ~  40 C11)
Q iP =  ^  =  T0 for =  (12)
Q iM = Q iF =  ^20^ — 2̂0  ̂■ l°r i =  (13)
Not surprisingly, for a given nonstop city-pair market, the equilib­




























































































quantity provided by the monopolist, 5/2/3. Note also that (12)-(13) are 
identical to (6)-(7) since, in these markets, internal conditions have not 
changed. The result of the retaliation is that Airline A  is “hurt” in two 
contested markets, P M  and PF, since it produces the same quantity at 
a lower equilibrium price. Given (11)-(13), the reduced form of the static 
Airline A ’s punishment profit can be expressed as
3, 1 / 5 -
- p ( i ) P'
-)22 N. (14)
It can be shown that Airline B (or Airline C) earns a greater profit 
by entering in A ’s markets than by staying where it is and maximising 
monopoly profit where it was doing so before. In other words, the threat 
is credible22.
Finally, I am able to investigate under which conditions the trigger 
strategy forms a subgame perfect equilibrium. Using (8), (10) and (14), 
Airline A ’s incentive constraint (1) must satisfy the following inequality:
1 /5  2/ 1 — 26 
P [ 2 J U(1 - 6 )
22It has been argued that when players can freely (unlimitedly) discuss their strate­
gies in a pre-play communication (without making binding agreements), a coalition o f 
players might arrange plausible, mutually beneficial deviations from  Nash agreements 
(see Bernheim et al. [1987]). Consequently, one should investigate to what extent the 
trigger strategy described above forms a Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium. One way 
to examine this com plex issue is to consider the incentive o f a coalition o f two flag- 
carriers, say Airline B and Airline C, to jointly renege on the punishment equilibrium 
implied by the trigger strategy following Airline A ’s deviation. Dynamic consistency 
(coalition-proof equilibrium) requires that Airline B and Airline C equilibrium payoffs 
not be dominated by another feasible punishment, e.g., to accom modate Airline _4’s 
entry. In other words, the agreement (equilibrium) which specified that Airline B 
and Airline C enter into Airline A ’s markets and play a Cournot game forever, should 
Airline A ’s initial entry be observed, must be a coalition-proof equilibrium for the 
proper (punishment) subgame. It is not difficult to  show that this result always holds 
under partial liberalisation. Unfortunately, such a clear-cut result does not occur 
under complete liberalisation because o f the fixed costs associated with entry into a 





























































































This expression can be reduced to:
Several comments are in order. First, the result is independent of the 
number of domestic legs, N, operated by each flag-carrier. This is due 
to the fact that partial liberalisation does not affect competition in the 
domestic legs when cost complementarities are absent (i.e., when 7 =  0) 
and when all city-pair markets are of equal size. Second, given that 
Airline A  cannot gain much from entry but has a great deal to lose, it 
is not surprising to find that 6P provides large opportunity for collusion. 
Finally, the 6p required for sustaining a noncooperative collusive outcome 
under partial liberalisation is independent of the underlying parameters 
of the demand and cost functions. This follows from the symmetry of 
the model.
III.2 GAM E II: Complete Liberalisation
The same approach as in Section III.l is followed except that now each 
flag-carrier might simultaneously enter into one seventh freedom leg and 
2N  rivals’ domestic legs according to the repeated game described in 
Section II.l.
Let us first consider the case where each airline sticks to the existing 
bilateral agreements, i.e., where no use of seventh freedom and cabotage 
rights is made. This case is tantamount to the most collusive equilibrium 
outcome described in Section III.l, with Airline A, for example, operating 
aircraft on L — N  +  2 legs, serving 3IV +  2 different city-pair markets and 
setting the monopoly quantity in the P M  and P F  markets. Accordingly, 
Airline M’s profit function is similar to (4), which implies that optimal 
quantities and profit are identical to (5)-(7) and (8).
Matters are quite different for the deviation and the punishment 




























































































it operates aircraft on L =  3TV+3 legs (instead of the previous 7V+ 2 legs) 
serving 97V +  3 different city-pair markets. Among the 97V +  3 markets 
operated by Airline A. 37V are monopoly markets, 67V +  2 are duopoly 
markets and, finally, one market is simultaneously operated by the three 
flag-carriers. Since entry into a domestic leg is associated with fixed 
costs, F , a deviation implies that Airline A  incurs fixed costs equal to 
2NF. As before, Airline ,47s optimal deviation strategy is to enter at its 
best-response quantity given that Airline B and Airline C each produce 
the collusive output in the F M  market and the monopoly output in 
their previous domestic markets. It can be shown that Airline A ’s profit 
maximisation implies quantities (5)-(7), (9) and, in order to take the new 
opportunities of entry into account,
kF — — L2=&4/3
«15-II for
HII ..,7V (15)
Q'kP — (ikM =  Q’jF II •a II
(a—29)
4/3 ~~ 4/3 ' for k ,j  =  1, ..,7V (16)
Given (5)-(7), (9), (15)-(16), the reduced form of the static Airline 
A ’s deviation profit can be expressed as
7TDevA
1 /S\2 67V +  5
p\2J  ̂ 4 ) +  ^ ^ ) 23iV“ 2 i V F > 0 - (17)
After Airline .A’s deviation, it is assumed that Airline B and Air­
line C retaliate and simultaneously enter in all the markets throughout 
the network, i.e., they make use of their seventh freedom and cabotage 
rights granted under the complete liberalisation of the industry. As a 
consequence, after Airline A ’s deviation, a repeated static Cournot game 
is played on the 97V +  3 different city-pair markets, with each flag-carrier 
operating aircraft on L =  37V +  3 legs. It is important to notice that, 
following the retaliation, Airline A  is “hurt” in 37V+  2 contested markets, 
i.e., exactly all the markets it served prior to the deviation23. Under the
23This result should be contrasted with the partial liberalisation case, where Airline 




























































































symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium, Airline «4’s optimal quantities are
A  _  nA  _  nA  _ A  __  A  __ A  __  (a -6 )  _  S / i o \
QpM — Qp F — Qf M  — QkF — I j M  — 1iP — 40 ~  4 0 5 G ° )
„ A  _  „ A  _  A  _  A  _  A  _  A  _  (a-2fl )  _  (S -9 )  n q \
QiM — QiF — QkP — QkM — I j F  — QjP — 40 — 40 »
for all i ,k ,j  — 1 , N. Given (18)-(19), Airline A ’s punishment 
profit becomes
S(!)2(̂ )+̂ ) !<f>-2WF>0- <2o>Pu P '
Finally, using (8), (17) and (20), Airline ,4’s incentive constraint (1) 
must satisfy the following inequality in a subgame perfect equilibrium:
1 /Sx2r2Af +  l -  6(3N +  2) 
P ' 2 '  t 4(1 — 8)
i 1 /S -6K 2rfV (4-6<5) 
J +  p ' ~ 2 ~ '   ̂ 4(1 — 6)
The discount factor which sustains a noncooperative collusive out­
come under complete liberalisation, 6C, is given by
c  ̂ S2(2N +  l)  +  4 N (S -0 )2 -32NF/3 
c -  S2(3N +  2) +  6N{S -  9)2
This result suggests the following remarks:
1. Since 6C > 0, in equilibrium F < S2(2N  + 1 ) +  4N (S  — 0)2} =
F* 24. Therefore, the model allows for fixed costs but these must not 
be excessively high25. Notice that when this condition is satisfied, 
both profit functions (17) and (20) are positive.
2. It is easy to verify that as F  increase, <$c(-) decreases monotonically, 
suggesting that for a given collusive outcome the required discount 
factor becomes smaller as the fixed cost per leg increases.
24It can be shown that the threat is credible for fixed costs, F,  lower than F*.




























































































3. For N  ^  0 and/or F  0, 6C is a function of the underlying param­
eters of the demand and cost functions and the number of domestic 
legs.
The relation between 6C(-) and N  turns out to be important for 
the analysis that follows. Assume that the network is sufficiently large 
to allow us to treat N  as a continuous variable. We can show that, in 
equilibrium,
d6c =  S2[S2 +  2 ( S - 9 ) 2 -Q iF p ]
ON [S'2 (37V +  2) +  67V(S -  0)2]2 ~ 1 ; '
Therefore, two cases should be considered:
CASE I: Low Fixed Cost F  <  ^ [ S 2 +  2(5 -  9)2] =  F**.
In CASE I, F < F** and, as TV increases, the discount factor, 6C, 
required for the trigger strategy to form a subgame perfect equilibrium 
increases. This suggests that, for sufficiently small entry costs, when 
cabotage rights are granted to flag-carriers, the larger the network the 
more difficult it is to sustain collusion. In other words, the stability of 
the bilateral agreements is more difficult to attain when, ceteris paribus, 
multi-market flag-carriers operate large h-a-s networks and fixed costs 
associated with entry are small.
CASE II: High Fixed Cost F  >  ^ [ S 2 +  2(5 -  9)2) =  F**.
In CASE II, F  > F** and, as N  increases, the discount factor, 6C, 
required for the trigger strategy to form a subgame perfect equilibrium 
decreases. Consequently, an opposite conclusion to CASE I ensues: For 
fixed costs higher than F**, the larger the network, ceteris paribus, the 
easier it is to sustain some degree of cooperation.





























































































Proposition  1 Under CASE I, the scope for sustainable collusion with 
a trigger strategy is strictly larger under partial liberalisation (as defined 
m Section II). The opposite result is obtained under CASE II: The scope 
for sustainable collusion with a trigger strategy is strictly larger under 
complete liberalisation (as defined in Section II).
Corollary 1 When F  =  0, the range in which flag-carriers can sustain 
collusive equilibria is always larger under partial liberalisation. If N =  0 
and/or F  =  F**, the most collusive outcome is sustainable if the discount 
factor is larger than 1 /2 under both regulatory regimes. Notice that when 
N  =  0, flag-carriers do not operate domestic legs and, as a consequence, 
cabotage rights are not effective: Partial and complete liberalisation out­
comes are identical.
The proof consists in comparing the discount factors, 8C and 6p, 
required for the trigger strategy to form a subgame perfect equilibrium.
P ro o f  1
6e  >  ( < ) 6 p
S2(2N  +  1) +  4N (S -  9)2 -  32NF/3 1
S2(3N  +  2) +  6N(S -  6)2 ~  ( < ) 2
NS2 +  2N (S -  9)2 -  64NF/3 >  (<)0
F < ( > ) - ^ - [ S 2 + 2 ( S - e ) 2] =  F** < F *  □. 
64p
Notice that in equilibrium, for N /  0, it is always verified that F** < F*. 
In effect:
F ~ > F "  «=► ^ [ 5 2(2iV +  l)  +  4 7 V (5 -0 )2] > ^ [ 5 2 +  2 ( 5 - ^ ) 2]
= >  S2(3N +  2) +  6N (S  — 0)2 >  0, which is always true.
Thus, in CASE II, the upper and lower bounds on F  are given by F* >
F > F**.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the collusive outcome is not 




























































































complete liberalisation net social welfare26 27is larger under the collusive 
outcome when fixed costs axe higher than - ^^[ S2( N + l )  +  2N(S — 6)2} =  
F w 27. This happens because during the punishment phase (competitive 
phase), the fixed costs incurred by all flag-carriers lead to productive 
inefficiencies throughout the network. Given the absence of fixed costs 
associated with entry into intra-European legs, the collusive outcome is 
clearly not socially desirable under partial liberalisation.
In summary, the results of Proposition 1 suggest that, under low 
fixed costs, complete liberalisation is more likely to promote competition 
since a collusive outcome is more difficult to sustain, especially when the 
network is large. In contrast, for high fixed costs the analysis reveals that 
complete liberalisation provides a relatively larger opportunity to sustain 
collusion (even if tacit collusion is pervasive under partial liberalisation). 
Consequently, a simple EU policy implication of this paper could be 
stated as follows: Grant cabotage rights, i.e., complete liberalisation. If 
barriers to entry are significant, then work towards reducing fixed costs 
and institutional barriers.
III.3 Illustration and Numerical Example
In order to illustrate these results, let us first consider the following 
figures. Figure 2 and Figure 3 (see Appendix) exhibit the profile of 
required discount factors, an a function of the number of domestic legs. 
Since A7 is a positive integer, Sc(-) is a step function. As shown in Figure 
2, <5C(-) increases at a decreasing rate under CASE I. Under CASE II, 
<5C(-) is a decreasing function as can be observed in Figure 3.
Figure 4 (see Appendix) exhibits the range of equilibria for the 
intermediate case where F  =  F**. As suggested by Corollary 1, the most 
collusive outcome is sustainable if the discount factor is larger than 1 /2  
under both regulatory regimes.
26 Defined as the sum o f consumers’ surplus on each market xy  plus the econom ic 
profit o f the industry.
27To obtain this result, one must compare welfare under collusion with welfare under 




























































































Figure 5 (see Appendix) exhibits the range of equilibria as a func­
tion of F  when N =  No >  0. For a given number of domestic markets, 
8C decreases monotonically as F  increases.
Table I provides a numerical example for /? =  1, a  =  10,6 =  2, and 
TV =  0,1,2,3,4. In that case, F** =  y  =  2.125. Accordingly, CASE I 
would correspond to, e.g., F  =  1, while CASE II would correspond to, 
e.g., F =  3.
Table I: Numerical Example
CASE I
1 =  F  < F "  =  11 II II •f
t
CASE II
3 =  F  > F "  =  ¥
oII 6 c = 6 p > \ \ 6c =  6p > \
N =  1 «c > jjf and 6C> 6 P > \ 6C =  6P > \ 6C > and 6C < 1 < 6P
N =  2 6c >  H  and 6e > 6t > 1 O, II IV oH Sc > and Sc < \ < Sv
N =  3 6c >  and 6C > 6P > \ 6c =  6P > i S*c ^ and Sc <  ̂ < Sp
•ft*II 6C >  f f  and 6C > 6P > \ II c* IV 6c >  and 6C < $ < 6P
IV Conclusion
We have established under what conditions a trigger strategy can be 
sustained under both regulatory regimes. We have demonstrated that, 
for sufficiently low fixed costs, to be precise F  < F**, flag-carriers are 
more likely to sustain noncooperative collusive outcomes under partial 
liberalisation of the European airline industry. When fixed costs are nil, 
the range of discount factors over which tacit collusion can be sustained is 
always larger under partial liberalisation. We have shown, concomitantly, 
that when fixed costs associated with entry into domestic legs are high, 
F  > F**, the discount factor required to sustain the trigger strategy 
equilibrium is, ceteris paribus, lower under complete liberalisation. In 
this latter case, the high fixed costs act like a natural entry deterrent and 
flag-carriers are less eager to exploit new entry opportunities provided by 
the liberalisation of the industry. This appealing result is congruent with 
standard oligopoly theory. Flag-carriers that repeatedly meet each other 
in different markets are aware of their “spheres of influence” , spheres 
where they have an absolute or relative cost advantage, and recognise 




























































































Moreover, we have highlighted an interesting relationship between the 
size of the network and the ease of sustaining collusion. When fixed costs 
are low, the larger the domestic network the higher the discount factor 
required for sustaining collusion, while when fixed costs are high, the 
larger the network the lower the discount factor required for sustaining 
collusion. This result implies that for large networks and large fixed 
costs, collusive outcomes are easier to sustain in equilibrium.
There are some interesting policy implications. First, Section III.l 
suggests that flag-carriers have large opportunities for sustaining collu­
sion, given the low threshold of 8p, under partial liberalisation. This is 
due to the fact that, in this three-airline model, as a flag-carrier enters 
into one intra-European leg (one market) it hurts simultaneously two 
rivals, which are supposed to retaliate. Consequently, the flag-carrier 
which decides to enter in that leg, expects to be hurt in two legs (two 
markets).. This is an inherent implication of the seventh freedom com­
petition in the European airline industry. Second, Section III.2 shows 
how fixed costs play an important role under complete liberalisation, 
given that a flag-carrier is likely to have a competitive advantage in its 
domestic leg. Fixed costs may be high as a result of a flag-carrier’s air­
port and/or route dominance. We have found that, for a given number 
of domestic legs operated in the network, the lower the fixed costs, the 
higher is the incentive to enter and deviate from past bilateral agree­
ments. Complete liberalisation provides the opportunity to operate a 
larger network so that reaping general short-run gains (i.e., deviating) 
could turn out to be a successful strategy when fixed costs are low and 
flag-carriers have relatively high impatience. If fixed costs are high, the 
incentive to deviate is, ceteris paribus, lower and collusion is more likely 
to be sustained under complete liberalisation.
Thus, even if complete liberalisation of the European airline in­
dustry gives the opportunity to any EU airline to have access to any 
intra-EU routes, it may be the case that airlines are better off sticking 
to past bilateral agreements. This is more likely to occur when airlines 
operate large domestic networks and it is costly to run a new business 




























































































ropean airline industry, like congested airports and air space, raise the 
fixed costs associated with entry. Many airline experts recognise that the 
shortage of airport capacity is likely to put incumbent flag-carriers in a 
much better opportunity to block entry by purchasing or leasing most of 
the gates at the home airport, thereby raising rivals’ fixed costs. Further­
more, as stressed by Borenstein [1992], the potential for home-country 
bias is intensified in this industry because so much of the infrastructure 
needed by airlines is publicly provided. In fact, Borenstein [1992] argues 
that the commercial success of an airline entry into a new leg depends on 
local governments and local airport managers who can play a substantial 
role in determining key features such as the use of airport facilities, con­
venience of connections, etc.. Our results suggest that barriers to entry 
into domestic niches should be minimised if EU authorities or national 
governments want to promote competition (or restrict noncooperative 
collusion) in this industry. To this end, any removal of institutional bar­
riers could provide a signal for flag-carriers to act more competitively.
Finally, for relatively high fixed costs, F w < F  < F*, the collusive 
outcome is not socially undesirable under complete liberalisation because 
competition leads to high productive inefficiencies.
The main results of the paper hold under a variety of different de­
mand and cost structures because they are driven by the network h-a-s 
structure and by the fixed costs associated with entry28. The analy­
sis could be extended in several directions. First, it would be inter­
esting to analyse how the range of discount factors is modified with 
(product) air service differentiation. Second, some asymmetries could 
be introduced such as different city-pair market growth rates, (for exam­
ple, intra-European markets could grow at a higher rate than domestic 
markets), different marginal costs and/or different network sizes among 
flag-carriers. Third, the model could allow for entry into the network by
28Whether a particular regulatory scheme enhances flag-carriers to sustain collusion 
remains an interesting but dilficult question to answer when cost complementarities 
arise. In fact, when returns to density are increasing it may well be the case that 
the range in which flag-carriers can sustain collusion is more important under both 
regulatory schemes, because o f the (negative) effects an entry could induce throughout 




























































































smaller (regional) airlines. A smaller airline could incur additional (sunk) 
costs with respect to incumbent flag-carriers. Finally, one might test to 
what extent the European airline industry actually is in the “mutual 
forbearance” equilibrium described above.
As a final remark, throughout the paper I have assumed that flag- 
carriers always seek profit maximisation. This is clearly a strong as­
sumption for flag-carriers which are partly or entirely publicly owned. 
However, the successful privatisation of the largest European flag-carrier, 
British Airways, has seemed to speed up the privatisation of most Eu­
ropean flag-carriers (e.g., Lufthansa) and, as a consequence, one might 
suppose that profit maximisation becomes a reasonable objective. Hav­
ing said this does not prevent me from thinking that, in this industry, 
the economics of national pride are still at work.
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F igure 3: R ange o f  E qu ilib ria  for bc and  bp w h en  F  =  F * * .
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